Doe ex rel Doe v. Elmbrook School District and the Creation of the Pervasively Religious Environment by Tieke, Christopher
University of Cincinnati Law Review 
Volume 81 Issue 4 Article 9 
September 2013 
Doe ex rel Doe v. Elmbrook School District and the Creation of the 
Pervasively Religious Environment 
Christopher Tieke 
University of Cincinnati College of Law, tiekecc@mail.uc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher Tieke, Doe ex rel Doe v. Elmbrook School District and the Creation of the Pervasively Religious 
Environment, 81 U. Cin. L. Rev. (2013) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/9 
This Student Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by University of Cincinnati College of 
Law Scholarship and Publications. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Cincinnati Law Review by an 
authorized editor of University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications. For more information, 
please contact ronald.jones@uc.edu. 
 
1591 
DOE EX REL DOE V. ELMBROOK SCHOOL DISTRICT AND THE 
CREATION OF THE PERVASIVELY RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT 
Christopher C. Tieke∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Deeply woven into the fabric of our country is the idea that choice in 
religious matters should be made in the conscience of each individual 
rather than established through the directives of government.  Decades 
after authoring the First Amendment, forever ensuring freedom of 
religious choice for all Americans, James Madison noted: 
The example of the Colonies, now States, which rejected religious 
establishments altogether, proved that all Sects might be safely & 
advantageously put on a footing of equal & entire freedom . . . .  We are 
teaching the world the great truth . . . that Religion flourishes in greater 
purity, without than with the aid of Gov[ernment].1 
Hardly the “truth” that Madison theorized it to be, the First 
Amendment’s express declaration in the Establishment Clause that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion” 
has generated much controversy throughout American history and 
continues to do so today.2  In a tradition as old as the Constitution itself, 
Americans have called on courts to solve that controversy. 
In Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook School District,3 the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed the issue of whether 
certain actions by a government entity, here a public school district, 
violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  In 
Elmbrook, former and current students and their parents alleged that the 
School District violated the Establishment Clause by holding graduation 
ceremonies in the main sanctuary of a local Christian evangelical and 
 
             ∗   Associate Member, 2012–13 University of Cincinnati Law Review.  The author would like to 
thank his family for their unending support. 
 1. Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingstone (July 10, 1822), in 9 THE WRITINGS OF 
JAMES MADISON: COMPRISING HIS PUBLIC PAPERS AND HIS PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE, INCLUDING 
NUMEROUS LETTERS AND DOCUMENTS NOW FOR THE FIRST TIME PRINTED 98, 102–03 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 
1910). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 3. 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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non-denominational church.4  Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit, in a 
divided opinion, held that the practice violated the Establishment Clause 
because it represented an unconstitutional endorsement of religion by a 
state institution and the message of endorsement was coercive toward 
the attendees.5  This Casenote addresses whether the Seventh Circuit’s 
decision in Elmbrook unnecessarily expanded the scope of current 
United States Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Part 
II of this Casenote explains the current framework established by the 
U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating Establishment Clause questions.  
Part III details the Seventh Circuit’s application of that interpretive 
framework to the facts of Elmbrook.  Part IV suggests that the Elmbrook 
decision is inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent in that it 
mischaracterizes endorsement as mere exposure and unnecessarily 
expands coercion beyond forced religious participation.  Finally, Part V 
of this Casenote calls for a renewed emphasis on the state’s purpose 
when evaluating instances when a public institution interacts with a 
religious environment and also concludes by suggesting the implications 
of Elmbrook on public institutions. 
II.  FIRST AMENDMENT: THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The majority decision in Elmbrook clearly reflects the position that 
the First Amendment demands that the government remain neutral 
between the religious and the secular, as well as between differing 
religions.6  Central to those who advocate for neutrality is the idea that 
the First Amendment’s purpose is to ensure that religious choice is left 
to the conscience of each human being and is devoid of any state 
influence or supervision.  Moreover, neutrality prevents any one religion 
from being so closely associated with the state as to create divisiveness 
in society.7  The decision by the majority in Elmbrook to focus on 
endorsement and coercion reflects an emphasis on the view that 
participation in religion must remain an individual choice that is 
completely uninfluenced by state actions. 
A. Endorsement 
Since 1971, federal courts have largely used the test established by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman as the lens through 
 
 4. Id. at 842. 
 5. Id. at 856. 
 6. Id. at 850. 
 7. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 805–06 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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which to view Establishment Clause issues.8  Under the Lemon test, 
actions by the state must: (1) have a secular purpose; (2) have a primary 
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) not foster 
excessive government entanglement with religion.9 
The second element of the Lemon test assessing effects has largely 
developed into a process where courts consider whether state action or 
legislation seems to endorse or favor religion generally or one religion 
over another.  The concept of analyzing effects as a product of 
endorsement was first introduced by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in 
her concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly.10  There she argued that the 
question under the Lemon effects prong is not whether the action 
advances or inhibits religion; rather, the determinative issue is whether 
the government practice has “the effect of communicating a message of 
government endorsement or disapproval of religion.”11  This analytical 
framework was adopted by the Court in County of Allegheny v. 
American Civil Liberties Union, where it held that the nativity scene 
display standing alone on the steps of the Allegheny County Courthouse 
violated the Establishment Clause because the crèche was unmistakably 
a religious symbol and its display, in the context of no other decorations, 
represented an impermissible governmental endorsement of one religion 
over another.12  In the same decision, the Court upheld as constitutional 
the December holiday display at the Allegheny city–county building 
consisting of a menorah, a Christmas tree, and a “salute to liberty” 
sign.13  Unlike the crèche, the menorah was flanked by other symbols 
and a reasonable person viewing the display would not perceive 
government endorsement of one religion over another.14  In Books v. 
City of Elkhart, Indiana, the Seventh Circuit expressly followed the 
analytical approach of Allegheny by holding that a display of a copy of 
the Ten Commandments on the lawn of the Elkhart Municipal building 
 
 8. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (holding that Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes providing direct 
state aid to church-related elementary and secondary schools violated the First Amendment).  
 9. Id. at 612–13.  When assessing purpose under the first prong of the Lemon test, courts look 
not only to expressed intent, but they also look beyond any stated purposes to the implicit intent behind 
the legislation or state action.  See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 10. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).  The majority held that the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island did not run 
afoul of the Establishment Clause when it erected a Christmas display that included a Santa Claus 
house, a Christmas tree, a banner that read, “SEASONS GREETINGS,” and a Nativity scene.  Applying 
the Lemon test the Court held that the city had the secular purpose of celebrating Christmas as 
motivation for the display, and that the display did not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion 
nor did it create excessive entanglement between religion and government.  Id. at 685.  
 11. Id. at 691–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 12. 492 U.S. 573, 598–602 (1989). 
 13. Id. at 620; see also id. at 635 (quoting “salute to liberty”). 
 14. Id. 
3
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had the impermissible purpose of promoting religion and had the effect 
of advancing a religious viewpoint.15  The Court stated that “[w]hen 
employing this analytical approach, we are charged with the 
responsibility of assessing the totality of the circumstances surrounding 
the display to determine whether a reasonable person would believe that 
the display amounts to an endorsement of religion.”16  Under the current 
interpretation of the Lemon test, any action by the government that, 
despite a secular purpose, has the effect of symbolically endorsing 
religion in the eyes of the reasonable person will be found to violate the 
First Amendment.17 
B. Coercion 
It is unclear what role, if any, coercion plays in the Supreme Court’s 
evaluation of an issue under Lemon.  However, the Court in recent years 
has introduced the element of coercion into its Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence.18  In his opinion in Lee v. Wiseman, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy stated that “[i]t is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the 
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to 
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a 
way which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do 
so.’”19  In Lee, the Court considered whether a public high school may 
have a member of the clergy lead the attendees in a prayer at the 
school’s graduation ceremony.20  Finding the activity impermissible 
under the Establishment Clause, the majority emphasized the coercive 
aspect of allowing prayer at a high school graduation ceremony.21  
Simply the school’s act of forcing students to stand as a demonstration 
of respect represented an implicit message of coerced participation.22  
The school’s argument that attendance was voluntary was not 
persuasive, as the Court found that due to the overall significance of 
high school graduation in American society, attendance was in no real 
 
 15. 235 F.3d 292, 303–04 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 16. Id. at 304. 
 17. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997) (the “entanglement” prong of the 
Lemon test has largely been subsumed under L mon’s second prong and excessive entanglement 
between government and religion is viewed as resulting in impermissible endorsement of religion by the 
government). 
 18. For a thorough discussion of how a non-coercion standard may be a valuable framework for 
evaluating Establishment Clause issues see Michael W. McConnell, Co rcion: The Lost Element of 
Establishment, 27 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 933 (1987). 
 19. 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 669 (1984)). 
 20. Id. at 580. 
 21. Id. at 592. 
 22. Id. at 593. 
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sense voluntary.23  In Lee, the Court made no attempt to reconcile its 
opinion with Lemon and its cases regarding school prayer. Instead, the 
Court deemphasized the application of Lemon in favor of a search for 
expressed or implicit government coercion of religious activity.24 
The coercion analysis established in Lee provided the framework for 
the Supreme Court’s latest decision on prayer in the public school 
context, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.25  In Santa Fe, a 
group of students and their parents filed a claim against the Santa Fe 
Independent School District alleging that the district’s policy of 
permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer before football games 
violated the Establishment Clause.26  Writing for the majority, Justice 
Stevens used the Court’s coercion analysis in Lee to dismiss the school’s 
principal arguments that the pre-game messages were not coercive 
because they were the product of student choice and that attendance at 
an extracurricular event, such as a football game, was completely 
voluntary.27  The Court in Santa Fe emphasized that the transmission of 
religious beliefs is mainly the province of the private sector and 
allowing a student vote regarding prayer at football games “encourages 
divisiveness along religious lines in a public school setting.”28  
Moreover, while the informal pressure for a student to attend a football 
game may have been less than the pressure to attend graduation, 
attendance at football games was part of the complete educational 
experience.29  Regardless, much like the attendees at a graduation 
ceremony, the students were susceptible to the implicit pressure to 
participate in the prayer that resulted from being part of a traditional 
community gathering.30  The Constitution, according to the Court, does 
not allow a school to force its students to make the choice between 
 
 23. Id. at 595. 
 24. See generally Stephen M. Durden, In the Wake of Lee v. Weisman: The Future of School 
Graduation Prayer is Uncertain at Best, 2001 B.Y.U. EDUC. &  L.J. 111 (2001). 
 25. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).  It is important to also note that the petitioners facially challenged the 
District’s policy regarding prayer at football games despite the fact that the student-led prayers had not 
yet occurred.  Although not acknowledging it, the Court analyzed the facts in Santa Fe under the Lemon 
test.  Applying the “purpose” prong of the Lemon test, the Court held that the text of the policy 
preferring a religious message and the context of a tradition of prayer at football games in the District 
demonstrated that the District had the impermissible purpose of encouraging prayer at an important 
school event.  Id.at 317.  Justice Rehnquist in dissent not only criticized Justice Stevens for not 
elaborating on which Establishment Clause test he was applying, but also for holding that the policy is 
facially unconstitutional rather than waiting for an as-applied challenge to the policy.  Id. at 318–19 
(Rehnquist, J. dissenting). 
 26. Id. at 294. 
 27. Id. at 310.  
 28. Id. at 311. 
 29. Id.  The Court went on to emphasize that some of the students, such as cheerleaders, team 
members, and band members were not at the game voluntarily.  Id.  
 30. Id. at 312. 
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giving up certain rights and benefits as the price for not conforming to a 
religious practice endorsed or established by the state.31 
The relationship between the traditional Lemon test and coercion 
remains unclear.  In fact, the Elmbrook court acknowledged this 
ambiguity, stating “[a]part from how one views the coercion test in 
relation to the Lemon test, however, it is evident that if the state 
‘coerce[s] anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise,’ an 
Establishment Clause violation has occurred.”32  This statement by the 
court seems to suggest that actions by the state to coerce religious 
participation may alone be enough to create an Establishment Clause 
violation.  The Seventh Circuit was unwilling to go that far (or 
acknowledge that it indeed had) and thus applied both the traditional 
Lemon analysis and the coercion test to analyze the Elmbrook School 
District’s graduation ceremony. 
III.  DOE EX REL DOE V. ELMBROOK SCHOOL DISTRICT 
A. Case History 
In April 2009, current and former students of Elmbrook School 
District (School District) and their parents brought a claim against the 
School District in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Wisconsin.33  The plaintiffs (Does), all of whom are not 
Christians and felt “uncomfortable, upset, offended, unwelcome, and/or 
angry because of the religious setting [of the graduation ceremony],” 34 
sought preliminary and permanent injunctions against the School 
District, monetary damages, and a declaratory judgment that it is 
unconstitutional to hold graduation ceremonies in a non-denominational, 
evangelical Christian church.35  Both parties filed a motion for summary 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840,850 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Lee v. 
Wiseman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1984)). 
 33. Id. at 842. 
 34. Id. at 848. Doe 1 graduated from a School District high school in 2009.  Doe 2 is Doe 1’s 
parent.  Doe 2 also has an older child whose graduation was held in the Church in 2005 and younger 
children who attend school in the School District.  Doe 3 is one of Doe 2’s younger children who will 
graduate from a School District high school no later than 2014.  Does 4 and 9 are the parents of children 
currently attending School District schools.  Does 5 and 6 are the parents of Does 7 and 8, who each had 
their graduation ceremonies at the Church in 2002 and 2005 respectively.  Does 2, 4, 5 and 6 all pay 
property taxes that go to the School District.  Id  at 847–48.  
 35. Does 1, 7, 8, 9, individually v. Elmbrook Joint Common Sch. Dist. No. 21, No. 09-C-0409, 
2010 WL 2854287, at *1 (E.D. Wis. July 19, 2010), aff’d sub nom. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. 
Dist., 658 F.3d 710 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011) and rev’d 
and remanded sub nom, Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2012). 
6
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judgment.36  The plaintiffs argued four points: (1) the graduation 
ceremonies at Elmbrook Church (Church) violated the Establishment 
Clause’s provision precluding religious coercion; (2) a public school 
district holding graduation ceremonies at a religious institution 
represented an impermissible government endorsement of religion; (3) 
the School District’s rental arrangement with the Church was excessive 
entanglement between religion and government; and (4) the School 
District was using taxpayer money to endorse religion.37  Applying the 
current U.S. Supreme Court Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
district court granted the School District’s motion for summary 
judgment and dismissed the case.38 
The plaintiffs appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals.39  In a 2-1 opinion written by Judge Ripple, the Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s decision, emphasizing the heavily fact-based 
nature of an Establishment Clause inquiry.40  The court further explained 
that the record did not indicate any evidence that the School District 
endorsed the Church’s mission or its beliefs, nor did rental of the 
premises for the graduation ceremony result in excessive entanglement 
between the School District and the Church.41  In dissent, Judge Flaum 
argued that the School District’s graduation ceremonies at the Church 
conveyed a government endorsement of religion and were inherently 
coercive and divisive.42 
In November 2011, the Seventh Circuit granted the Does’ petition for 
rehearing en banc and vacated its original September 2011 decision.  
The final en banc decision was issued in July 2012. 
 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at *8. 
 38. Id. at *15. 
 39. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist, 658 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc 
granted, opinion vacated (Nov. 17, 2011).  The case was argued in front of Chief Judge Easterbrook, 
Judge Flaum and Judge Ripple. 
 40. Id. at 734. 
 41. Id. In its opinion, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that the proper lens to evaluate 
Establishment Clause challenges was through the test established in Lemo v. Kurtzman.  See discussion 
supra Part II(A).  Despite dismissing the coercion elements of the plaintiff’s claims, the Court pointed 
out that in analyzing state-facilitated displays of religious iconography or messages, the preferred 
method of analysis for the U.S. Supreme Court is the Lemon test rather than an independent and 
exclusive coercion test.  Id. at 729. 
 42. Id. at 740.  Here Judge Flaum seemed to be echoing the dissent in Z lman v. Simmons-Harris 
where Justice Breyer expressed his belief that the Establishment Clause was meant to prevent religious 
conflict and divisiveness by ensuring that government would not prefer one religion over another.  536 
U.S. 639, 723 (2002) (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
7
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B. Facts 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent demands that courts reviewing an 
Establishment Clause issue engage in a detailed exploration of the 
context and factual situation in which the claim was brought as a means 
of assessing how government interacts with religion.43  In its description 
of the facts, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the School District’s 
decision-making process regarding the graduation ceremony, the 
surroundings of the Church on the day of the graduation, and the 
ensuing controversy over the facility.44  The School District is a 
municipal public school district in Brookfield, Wisconsin.45  There are 
two major high schools in the School District, Brookfield Central 
(Central) and Brookfield East (East).46  In 2000, Central’s senior class 
officers approached School District Superintendent, Matt Gibson, about 
moving the graduation ceremony to the Church, as the school’s 
gymnasium was “too hot, cramped, and uncomfortable.”47  Gibson had 
no objection, and with an affirmative vote by the senior class, the 
principal of Central approved the move.48  Similarly, after a vote of 
approval by the majority of seniors, East moved its graduation 
ceremonies to the Church in 2002.49  The graduation ceremonies of each 
school continued to be held at the Church from 2000 to 2009 with a 
rental cost to the School District consistently between $2,000 and 
$2,200 per year for each school’s graduation ceremony.50  Funding for 
the graduation ceremonies was a combination of contributions from the 
senior class and the School District’s general revenues, which were 
derived from property taxes.51  In 2010, the School District ceased using 
the Church and the graduation ceremonies were moved to the School 
 
 43. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 44. Id. at 844–48. 
 45. Id. at 844. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. The court later noted that District Superintendent Gibson was a member of the Church for 
the entire period during which graduation ceremonies were held there.  However, the court stated there 
was no evidence that Mr. Gibson influenced or attempted to influence the student vote.  Id. a  845. 
 48. Id. at 844.  Central also rented the Church, for at least some years after 2003, for senior 
honors night at a rate between $500 and $700.  Id. at 845. 
 49. Id. at 845.  Here the court noted that between 2000 and 2005 the students of the senior class 
of each school participated in advisory votes to choose between two or three other venues, which always 
included the Church as a choice.  However, after continuous overwhelming support for the Church as a 
venue for graduation the Church was simply selected as the venue for the graduation ceremonies 
without a vote from the students between 2006–09.  Id.  This overwhelming support for the Church was 
evidenced by a vote of approval from 90% of the seniors who voted at East in 2005.  Id. at 845 n.4. 
 50. Does 1, 7, 8, 9, individually v. Elmbrook Joint Common Sch. Dist. No. 21, No. 09-C-0409, 
2010 WL 2854287, at *4 (E.D. Wis. July 19, 2010). 
 51. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 845 (7th Cir. 2012).  
8
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District’s newly constructed field house.52 
The Church is a local Christian evangelical and non-denominational 
religious institution.53  As well as holding its own religious ceremonies, 
the Church often makes its facilities available to outside groups.54  There 
are many religious symbols both inside and outside of the Church.  The 
sign displaying the name “Elmbrook Church” contains a cross and there 
is a cross on the Church roof.55  In the Church lobby there are religious 
posters on the wall, as well as tables and stations with religious literature 
and information, some of which is addressed to young adults.56  
Throughout its use by the School District, the permanent interior and 
exterior adornments and decorations of the Church remained largely 
unchanged during the graduation ceremonies, except for the introduction 
of school banners and a projection of the school name.57  However, at 
the request of the School District’s superintendent, the Church removed 
any non-permanent religious symbols from the dais where students with 
roles in the ceremony and school officials sat during the ceremony.58  
The graduating students sat in the front pews of the sanctuary while the 
guests filled in the remaining pews.59  The pews were not emptied of 
religious materials and books used in normal services at the Church, but 
there was no evidence that any of these materials were placed there by 
the Church specifically for the School District’s graduation 
ceremonies.60 
In 2001, the School District received its first complaint regarding the 
graduation ceremonies.61  A non-Christian parent objected to the School 
District’s use of the Church because she did not want her child exposed 
to the Church’s views regarding those who did not share the Church’s 
teachings on faith.62  Various lobbies and civil liberties groups voiced 
their concerns.63  Chief among these groups was Americans United for 
 
 52. Id. at 847.  Central High School’s honors night was also moved to its newly renovated 
gymnasium in 2010. 
 53. Id. at 844. 
 54. Id. at 863. 
 55. Id. at 845–46. 
 56. Id. at 846.  The District admitted that Church members manned the tables and passed out 
information at the 2002 and 2009 graduation ceremonies.  Id. 
 57. Id. at 853.  According to an email sent by Superintendent Gibson, the cross hanging over the 
dais was mistakenly covered by a janitor for the 2000 ceremony.  It was never covered again during the 
eight subsequent years the School District used the Church for graduation ceremonies.  Id. at 844 n.11. 
 58. Id. at 846. 
 59. Id. at 846–47. 
 60. Id. at 847. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.   
 63. Id. In 2001, the Freedom from Religion Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union 
of Wisconsin expressed concerns about using the Church for graduation ceremonies.  The Anti-
9
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Separation of Church and State who contacted School District 
Superintendent Gibson in 2007.64  Communicating with counsel, 
Superintendent Gibson stressed that although the ceremonies were held 
at the Church, there were no references to religion during the ceremony, 
and he assured counsel that no religious literature would be distributed.65  
Superintendent Gibson also reiterated that the School District was 
building a new field house that, upon its completion, could 
accommodate the ceremonies.66  Both Central and East moved their 
graduation ceremonies to the field house immediately after it was 
completed.67 
C. Judge Flaum and the Majority: Endorsement and Coercion 
Having previously written the dissent in the Seventh Circuit’s 
September 2011 decision, Judge Flaum authored the majority opinion in 
the July 2012 decision.68  Reiterating many of the arguments he made in 
his initial dissent, Judge Flaum held that the School District’s graduation 
ceremonies at the Church impermissibly endorsed religion under the test 
established in Lemon.69  Moreover, the message of endorsement was 
religiously coercive under Lee and Santa Fe.70 
1. Endorsement Analysis 
The Does alleged that the practice of holding a public school 
graduation ceremony in a non-denominational, evangelical church 
effectively represented government endorsement of one religion over 
another.71  The majority began its analysis of Elmbrook with the Lemon 
test, asking whether the primary effect of the government conduct 
advanced or inhibited religion.72  The court concluded that the problem 
 
Defamation League objected in 2002 as well.  Id. 
 64. Id.   
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 842; see Doe ex. rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 734–40 (7th Cir. 
2012). 
 69. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 851–54 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 70. Id. at 854–56. 
 71. Id. at 851 n.15.  In Elmbrook, the parties stipulated that the District had a secular purpose in 
choosing the Church as the venue for its graduation ceremonies.  Therefore, the Court did not evaluate 
the first-prong of the Lemon test which considers the government’s purpose with respect to the activity.  
Id.  While the Does did argue excessive entanglement, the court did not consider the third-prong 
regarding “entanglement” as their decision rested on a violation of the second-prong of Lemon relating 
to effects.  Id. 
 72. Id. at 851; see supra Part II(A). 
10
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with the School District’s graduation ceremonies was that the religious 
symbols that adorned the Church promoted religious beliefs and created 
a “pervasively religious environment” where the attendees, particularly 
the students, may have felt pressure to adopt them.73  Citing Stone v. 
Graham, the court found that the problem with the School District’s 
graduation ceremony was essentially the same problem that is created 
when religious teachings, practices, and symbols are brought into the 
school environment.74  By creating this analogy, Judge Flaum and the 
majority attempted to situate the graduation ceremony among U.S. 
Supreme Court precedent dealing with religious symbols and prayer in 
public schools.75   
Though there was no allegation that the School District’s purpose was 
to promote religion, the majority argued that the environment itself 
created the same effect of endorsement that is found when religious 
activities are brought into the school building.  Then, in painstaking 
detail, the court explored the various religious symbols that contributed 
to the sheer “religiosity” of the space and the unmistakable link between 
church and state it perpetuated.76  The court noted that a large Latin 
cross, the symbol of Christianity, adorned the interior of the auditorium 
in which the ceremony was held.77  Lining the walls of the lobby 
adjoining the auditorium were posters and banners geared toward 
encouraging religious devotion among middle school and high school 
aged students.78  Along the walls were tables and stations with 
pamphlets and information relating to themes and questions posed by 
the posters.79  The pews in which the guests sat also contained religious 
materials, some of which were cards soliciting membership in the 
Church.80  Moreover, mixed among the religious décor and literature 
 
 73. Id. at 856. 
 74. Id. at 851 (citing Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41–42 (1981) (holding that the posting of a 
copy of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public school classroom in the state of Kentucky 
violated the Establishment Clause.  Despite the Kentucky state legislature’s insistence that the purpose 
of the posting was secular, the Court held that the posting of the Ten Commandments served no 
educational purpose and only induced the students to “read, meditate upon, perhaps to venerate and 
obey, the commandments”)). 
 75. Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 851; see Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (holding that a 
Louisiana statute requiring public schools that teach evolution to also teach creationism violated the 
Establishment Clause as the purpose of the statute was to endorse a religious doctrine); see also,
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating a state law allowing public school teachers to insist 
on a moment of silence in the classroom as a violation of the Establishment Clause because the law had 
no secular purpose). 
 76. Id. at 852–53. 
 77. Id. at 852. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
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were symbols of the school which the majority felt implied that the 
School District placed its “imprimatur” on the Church’s message.81  
While the court noted that a reasonable observer would be aware that the 
materials and literature displayed were not placed there by the School 
District, the same reasonable observer may conclude that because the 
School District chose the Church for its graduation ceremony, it 
approved the Church’s religious message.82  
The majority quickly dispatched the argument that the School District 
exercised less control over the environment then they may have had 
over school-owned property.  The court noted that this line of analysis 
regarding control would detract from the dispositive facts that the 
School District chose the Church over other venues and effectively 
required attendance at the graduation ceremony.83  Relying on Santa Fe, 
the court concluded that even though the students voted overwhelmingly 
in support of the decision to hold graduation ceremonies at the Church, 
that vote did not save the administration’s actions from being challenged 
on First Amendment grounds.84  Furthermore, the court pointed out that 
a vote may have actually reinforced the minority status of those who 
hold beliefs not consistent with the majority.85 
2. Coercion Analysis 
After its finding of religious endorsement, the majority went on to 
hold that the practice was also religiously coercive under the precedent 
established in Lee and Santa Fe.86  While both Lee and Santa Fe 
involved forced religious activity, the majority found those cases 
indistinguishable from Elmbrook in that the students at the graduation 
ceremony represented a “captive audience,” and those students who may 
have held minority religious viewpoints were forced to watch their 
classmates reading the Church’s pamphlets, posing for pictures in front 
of its religious iconography, or meditating on the various religious 
symbols.87  According to the court, these activities “create a subtle 
 
 81. Id. at 853. 
 82. Id. at 853–54. 
 83. Id. at 854.  Interestingly the Court suggested that if school officials would have attempted to 
rid the Church of much of its religious symbolism, those acts may have represented “excessive 
entanglement” in violation of Lemon’s third prong.  Id.  
 84. Id. at 854. 
 85. Id. (quoting Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000) (“[M]ajoritarian 
election might ensure that most of the students are represented, it does nothing to protect the minority; 
indeed, it likely serves to intensify their offense.”)). 
 86. Id.; see supra Part II(B). 
 87. Id. at 855.  
12
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 81, Iss. 4 [2013], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss4/9
2013] CASENOTE—ELMBROOK SCHOOL DISTRICT 1603 
 
pressure to honor the day in a similar manner.”88  Relying on the 
argument in Lee that attendance at graduation ceremonies is not 
“voluntary,” considering the societal and personal significance of the 
event, the majority was unwilling to allow choice of a religious venue 
for the ceremonies to force some into choosing not to attend.89  Here, the 
implicit endorsement of religion due to the “pervasively religious” 
environment of the Church carried with it the subtle, but nonetheless, 
impermissible aspect of coercion.90  
D. The Dissenters 
1. Judge Ripple 
Judge Ripple, in dissent, reiterated his view expressed as the majority 
author in the vacated September 2011 decision.91  I  that opinion, Judge 
Ripple argued that while the Church may be laden with religious 
symbols and iconography, there was no evidence that the School District 
associated itself in any way with those symbols, nor was there evidence 
that any efforts were made to stock the pews and surroundings with 
religious materials prior to the graduation.92  In fact, the School District 
actively sought to remove non-permanent displays from the dais.93  
 
 88. Id.  Here the majority relied on Wallace v. Jaffree where the U.S. Supreme Court noted that 
school children are more susceptible to the pressure to conform. 472 U.S. 38, 60 n.51 (1985). The Court 
in Wallace stated that “when the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a 
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the 
prevailing official religion is plain.”  Id. at 70 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962)). 
 89. Id. at 856; see Lee v. Wiseman, 505 U.S. 577, 578 (1984). 
 90. Judge Hamilton, in concurrence, addressed the dissenting positions of both Judge Ripple and 
Judge Posner.  Attacking Judge Posner’s contention that when lacking precedent, judges will retreat to 
their own religious perspective, Judge Hamilton argued that in order to adopt the perspective of a 
reasonable non-adherent, judges will deliberately try to see the situation from perspective of the non-
adherent.  See id. at 858 (Hamilton, J., concurring).  In response to the dissent’s fear that courts will now 
be in the business of parsing an environment’s iconography as a means to evaluate endorsement, Judge 
Hamilton responded that the majority opinion did not decisively rest on the religious symbols and 
activities in the Church, rather the critical fact was that this “important rite of passage in life” for the 
students was held in any religious environment at all.  Id. at 857.  Finally, Judge Hamilton dismissed the 
dissent’s analogy to voting in a religious environment stating that voting is often done in the non-
consecrated parts of many different places of worship (churches, synagogues, mosques), voters have the 
option of early voting or absentee voting, and that voting is an individual act not a very public 
graduation ceremony.  Id. at 860. 
 91. Doe ex. rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 92. Id. at 731. 
 93. Id. Later in his majority opinion in the 2011 decision, Judge Ripple addressed potential 
entanglement issues.  Pointing to the U.S. Supreme Court’s contention in Agostini that entanglement 
must be excessive, Judge Ripple held that the District’s actions of removing certain religious 
decorations from the dais were de minimis and did not rise to the level of control or excessiveness 
required under Agostini.  Id. at 734.  Nor was the advisory student vote excessive entanglement as the 
13
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Moreover, the graduation ceremony itself was devoid of any references 
to religion or spirituality and was completely secular in its message.94  
Judge Ripple contended that the “objective observer” would understand 
that the religious decorations and information were part of the setting of 
the Church and did not mean that the School District, which had simply 
rented the space as other groups in the community had done in the past, 
implicitly sought to endorse the Church’s message.95  The School 
District did nothing more, in Judge’s Ripple’s view, than engage in “an 
arm’s-length business transaction” to rent a building from a church.96   
More than anything, Judge Ripple was concerned with the majority’s 
assertion that its decision was nothing more than the application of 
general Establishment Clause principles to a new set of facts.97  Instead, 
he argued, the decision in Elmbrook unnecessarily extended the holdings 
previously established in Lee and Santa Fe.98  In both Lee and Santa Fe, 
students were forced to partake in religious activities that were endorsed 
by their respective schools.  Unlike those cases, the School District’s 
graduation ceremony, while in a church building, made no reference to 
religion, the Church itself, or any other religious institution.99  Though 
Judge Ripple acknowledged that the audience may have been “captive” 
due to the gravity of the ceremony, they were not asked, like the 
audiences in Lee and Santa Fe, to participate in any religious activity or 
ceremony.100  Absent a coerced religious ceremony, Judge Ripple 
argued that the majority view stood for the proposition that students feel 
the same coercive pressure and message of endorsement from the 
incidental presence of religious symbols or iconography that they do 
from direct, forced religious activity exemplified in Lee and Santa Fe.101  
The students and their guests, or any reasonable person for that matter, 
would understand that any church would have religious literature and 
 
election was over a choice of venue for a completely secular ceremony.  Id. 
 94. Id. at 734. 
 95. Id. at 731.  Judge Ripple also noted that the record reflected that the graduates, and their 
parents by implication, understood that the Church was rented for the occasion because it was the 
preferred venue of the graduates participating in the ceremony.  Id. 
 96. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Ripple, J., 
dissenting). 
 97. Id. at 862. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 863. 
 100. Id. at 864.  The concept of the “captive audience” was introduced in Justice Souter’s 
concurring opinion in Lee, describing the students and their families who attended the graduation 
ceremony at issue in Lee where a religious speech was given.  505 U.S. 577, 630 (1984).  The audience 
was “captive” in the sense that though attendance was not required by the school, given the importance 
of high school graduation in American society, attendance, according to the Court, was not voluntary in 
any real sense.  Id. at 595. 
 101. Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 864. 
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decorations and that those religious items belong to the church itself and 
not the group renting the building.102 
Ultimately, Judge Ripple contended that rather than seeking to 
prevent government endorsement of religion or forced religious activity, 
courts would now be in the business of assessing whether a religious 
institution or environment is “too pervasively religious” to allow for any 
interaction between it and any government entity for fear of implicit 
coercion and endorsement.103  He wondered what would become of the 
teacher who wears a Star of David necklace or gold cross lapel pin, a 
public high school athletic team entering a religious school for athletic 
competition, or those same School District graduating students who 
enter a church to vote in the next election.104  The majority’s decision, 
he argued, forces the state to avoid any association with a “pervasively 
religious group,” thus permanently ostracizing those groups and 
preventing them from participating and becoming accepted into 
American society.105   
2. Chief Judge Easterbrook 
While echoing the views of his fellow dissenting judges, Chief Judge 
Easterbrook assumed a textual approach and declared that the standards 
established in Lemon have been created by Justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court and have no basis in the Establishment Clause’s text.106  The 
purpose of the Establishment Clause, according to Judge Easterbrook, is 
to prevent laws, such as mandatory attendance at religious ceremonies 
or religiously delegated taxes that would represent the government 
establishing religion.107  Here the School District needed an auditorium 
for its graduation ceremony, and it rented space for one day from the 
Church with no intention or desire to send any message other than 
perhaps that a “comfortable space is preferable to a cramped, over-
heated space.”108  Though Judge Easterbrook stipulated that the Church 
was full of symbols, so too, he argued, are the United Center in 
downtown Chicago and the Hilton hotel.109  Judge Easterbrook 
 
 102. Id. at 865. 
 103. Id. at 866. 
 104. Id. at 867–68.  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 869 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 870. 
 109. Id.  The United Center is a large arena in Chicago, Illinois.  It is home to the Chicago Bulls, a 
professional basketball team, and home to the Chicago Blackhawks, a professional hockey team.  
Outside the arena is a large statute of Michael Jordan, a former Bulls player.  The arena also has the 
United Airlines’ logo on the outside.   
15
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suggested that if the School District had held its graduation ceremonies 
in those venues there would have been no complaints that the School 
District had adopted basketball as its official sport or the Hilton chain as 
its official hotel.110  According to Judge Easterbrook, “no reasonable 
observer believes that renting an auditorium for a day endorses the way 
the landlord uses that space the other 364 days.”111  
Judge Easterbrook also struggled with the majority’s assertion that 
endorsement coerces.  He argued that coercion in Lee and Santa Fe was 
defined as the fear of ostracism and ridicule that goes along with a 
student’s refusal to participate in a religious activity.112  The School 
District’s graduation ceremony was completely devoid of any religious 
activity; therefore, no one was at risk of ostracism due to non-
participation.113  Moreover, Judge Easterbrook argued that endorsement 
and coercion are two separate concepts.  The government may endorse 
its own point of view, even on religion, without coercing anyone to 
participate.114  According to Judge Easterbrook, if endorsement and 
coercion are the same, as the majority reasons, and holding a graduation 
ceremony in a church endorses religion, then it must follow that holding 
government elections in a church represents an impermissible message 
of state endorsement of religion.115  For Judge Easterbrook, a proper 
view of neutrality allows the government to rent religious venues for 
secular activities.116 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 870–71.  
 113. Id. at 871. 
 114. Id. Here Judge Easterbrook referenced the U.S. Supreme Court’s explanation of the 
“government speech” doctrine in Johanns v. Livestock Marketing, 544 U.S. 550 (2005).  In Livestock a 
group of associations and individuals who were required by the Department of Agriculture to pay an 
assessment on all cattle sales or importation brought suit against the Department of Agriculture claiming 
that the use of those funds for communications supporting beef to beef producers violated the First 
Amendment.  Id. at 550.  The Supreme Court held that beef communications were government speech 
since the message and content were controlled by the government.  As a general rule, the government 
may use taxpayer funds to endorse its own message.  Id. at 560–62.   
 115. Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 871. 
 116. Judge Posner also wrote a dissent suggesting that Supreme Court case law regarding the 
Establishment Clause is in a state of disarray with no clear principles.  Moreover, the text and history of 
the Establishment Clause were of no help in deciding whether a public school may hold its graduation 
ceremonies in a church.  Id. at 872.  Therefore, he lamented the fact that judges often retreat to their own 
personal beliefs regarding religion.  Id. at 873.  Judge Posner then went on in the remainder of his 
opinion to echo many of the views of Judge Easterbrook, reiterating in particular the District’s secular 
purpose and the fact that exposure did not amount to coercion.  Id. at 874–78.  Particularly interesting is 
his assertion that the majority’s reliance on the religious imagery of the Church will require the courts in 
future cases to assess the iconography and religious symbols of an environment that seeks to do business 
with the state.  Id.   
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IV.  DISCUSSION 
For decades conservative members of the U.S. Supreme Court have 
been calling for an end to the use of the L mon test in evaluating 
Establishment Clause issues.  Most notably Justice Scalia has lamented 
that “[l]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits 
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and 
buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence . . . .”117 
The decision by the Seventh Circuit in Elmbrook yet again summoned 
the ghoul to find that the mere use of a religious space by a public 
school for its graduation ceremony represented state endorsement of 
religion.  However, even more frightening is the new specter of 
Elmbrook and its emphasis on the implicitly coercive impact of a 
“religiously pervasive” environment.   
The decision in Elmbrook mischaracterized mere interaction as 
endorsement and effectively eliminated any evaluation of purpose under 
the Lemon test.  The court’s decision also represented an unnecessary 
extension of the coercion doctrine and created an unworkable standard 
based on judicial perception of implicit, environmentally-created 
coercion.   
A. Endorsement as a Product of the “Pervasively Religious 
Environment” 
The majority in Elmbrook saw no distinction between instances when 
school administrators bring religious activities and symbols into school 
buildings and those times when pivotal school events, such as 
graduation, are celebrated in a church.  The court contended that “[t]he 
constitutional flaw with such activity is that it necessarily conveys a 
message of endorsement.”118 The court then mistakenly went on to 
situate the School District’s graduation ceremony alongside precedent 
dealing with religious activities and prayer in schools.119  This analogy 
is flawed in two ways.  First, mandates requiring school prayer and a 
 
 117. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 118. Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 851. 
 119. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); 
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Louisiana statute requiring that if evolution is taught in 
primary or secondary schools then creationism must also be taught has no secular purpose and 
impermissibly endorses religion by requiring creationism be taught over other theories); Sch. Dist. of 
Abington Twp., Penn. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Pennsylvania statute required the reading of 
bible verses in public schools violated the Establishment Clause as the readings were part of the school 
curriculum and were supervised by school staff); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, (1962) (school policy 
requiring daily reading of a non-denominational prayer composed by the state’s Board of Regents 
impermissibly represented state endorsement of certain religious ideas embodied in the prayer). 
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moment of silence force students to actively engage in religious 
ceremonies.  The School District students were not required to 
participate in any religious activity whatsoever, nor were they even 
required to attend the graduation ceremony.120  Second, the perception 
of state endorsement of religious activities in schools stems in large part 
from the fact that the activities are done on school property and are led 
by employees of the school.  The graduation ceremony was devoid of 
any reference to religion and a one-day rental of a church for a 
graduation ceremony hardly carries with it the message of endorsement 
that a daily school prayer or bible reading does.121  
The argument that the District’s yearly one-day rental of the Church 
for a completely secular religious ceremony confuses the purpose of the 
endorsement test.122  The current interpretation of Lemon’s second-
prong requires that state action have the “effect of communicating a 
message of government endorsement of religion.”123  It is not a stretch to 
see how the reasonable person would believe that the introduction of 
prayer or religious symbols into the classroom would communicate a 
message of school endorsement of religion.  However, to argue that the 
reasonable person would perceive that same effect when a public school 
rents a religious building on one occasion for a completely secular 
religious ceremony distorts the purpose of the endorsement test.124  This 
view of “endorsement by exposure” has been rejected by the Supreme 
Court as well as other federal courts.  In Agostini v. Felton, the Court, in 
upholding a New York City Board of Education program allowing 
public school teachers into parochial schools to provide remedial 
education, reinforced the position that “we no longer presume that 
public employees will inculcate religion simply because they happen to 
be in a sectarian environment.”125  Though district courts have adopted 
varying views, a number have rejected the view that the Establishment 
Clause is violated simply because a school holds certain events in a 
religious environment.  In Porta v. Klagholz, a district court in New 
 
 120. The majority contended that attendance was not voluntary given the societal importance of 
high school graduation.  See supra Part III(C)(2).  The dissent argued that the ceremony was not 
technically mandatory.  See Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 864 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
 121. See supra Part III(C)(2). 
 122. See supra Part II(A). 
 123. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691–92 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).  See supra 
Part II(A). 
 124. See supra Part II(A). 
 125. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997).  The Court referenced its holding in Zobrest v. 
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., where the Court held that placing a public employee in a school to provide 
interpretation skills for a deaf student did not violate the Establishment Clause.  Justice Rehnquist wrote 
that “the Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the placing of a public employee in a 
sectarian school.  Such a flat rule, smacking of antiquated notions of ‘taint,’ would indeed exalt form 
over substance.”  509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993). 
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Jersey upheld the constitutionality of a state statute allowing funding for 
a charter school operated in a church building stating that “the 
placement of a public school on church premises does not give rise to 
the presumption that religion is inculcated into the school, nor does it 
create a symbolic union between church and state.”126  Similarly, the 
majority in Elmbrook was unwilling to speculate on whether the state’s 
choice of a religious environment for public school ceremonies always 
represents a transgression of the Establishment Clause.127 
Recognizing that state endorsement of religion cannot be found solely 
in the School District’s decision to hold its graduation ceremonies in a 
church, the court then, in a slight of hand, switched its analysis to 
whether graduation ceremonies in the Elmbrook Church ran afoul of the 
Establishment Clause.128  This slight change in analytical perspective 
allowed the majority to search for endorsement in the specific 
environment and context in which the graduation took place, rather than 
endorsement of religion stemming from any forced religious activity in 
the ceremony itself.  Thus, the court in Elmbrook framed the second-
prong of the Lemon test in a manner consistent with how the Supreme 
Court has evaluated state-sponsored religious displays.129  The Elmbrook 
court adopted the approach taken in Books and looked to “the totality of 
the circumstances surrounding the display to determine whether a 
reasonable person would believe that the display amounts to an 
endorsement of religion.”130  Thus, much like the religious display cases, 
the court took an accounting of all the religious symbols and 
iconography that adorned the Church to arrive at the conclusion that a 
reasonable observer could believe that in choosing such a “proselytizing 
environment” the School District endorsed the message of the 
Church.131  Endorsement of religion by the School District was found in 
 
 126. 19 F. Supp. 2d 290, 302 (D.N.J. 1998); see also Verbena United Methodist Church v. 
Chilton County Bd. of Educ., 765 F. Supp. 704, 714 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (School Board may not deny a 
church access to a public high school auditorium for its church-sponsored baccalaureate mass as the 
practice did not result in a per se message of implicit state endorsement of religion).  But cf Spacco v. 
Bridgewater Sch. Dept., 722 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass. 1989) (School District may not assign students to 
classroom space rented in a Roman Catholic Church as there was an implicit message of state 
endorsement stemming from the symbolism of the church); Does v. Enfield Public Sch., 716 F. Supp. 2d 
172 (D. Conn. 2010) (public high school graduation ceremonies in a church represented an 
impermissible state entanglement with religion and coercion of students to adopt a certain religion).  For 
a more thorough discussion of these cases, see Christine Rienstra Kiracofe, Going to the Chapel, and 
We’re Gonna . . . Graduate?: Do Public Schools Run Afoul of the Constitution by Holding Graduation 
Ceremonies in Church Buildings?, 266 ED. LAW  REP. 583 (2011). 
 127. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 844 (7th Cir. 2012). 
 128. Id. at 843–44. 
 129. See supra Part II(A). 
 130. Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304 (7th Cir. 2000); see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. 
Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 597 (1989). 
 131. Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 854. 
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the environment itself rather than in any action by the School District 
requiring that the students participate in any religious activity. 
The court, in focusing on the religious nature of the environment 
itself, was able to make an end-run around the fact that there was no 
school mandated religious activity, nor did the School District have any 
intention of endorsing religion.  The Elmbrook court stated that 
preventing the School District from having graduation ceremonies at the 
Church was “consistent with well-established doctrine prohibiting 
school administrators from bringing church to the schoolhouse.”132  If 
that is true, then the scenario should have fallen squarely under the 
holding in Stone.133  The reason it did not was because in Stone, though 
the state trumpeted a secular purpose, its true purpose was revealed 
solely through its act of affixing the Ten Commandments to the walls of 
a public school classroom.134  Absent the classroom environment, the 
Ten Commandments may not carry the same message of religious 
endorsement.  Compare this to Van Orden v. Perry, where the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of a monument inscribed with the Ten 
Commandments as part of a display on the grounds of the Texas State 
Capital.135  The Court distinguished Stone, stating “[i]n the classroom 
context, we found that the Kentucky statute had an improper and plainly 
religious purpose.”136  According to the Court, the display at issue in 
Van Orden was a “far more passive use of those texts than was the case 
in Stone, where the text confronted elementary school students every 
day.”137  Plainly, the message of endorsement in Stone did not come 
from the inherently religious nature of the Ten Commandments 
themselves, but rather the way in which they were displayed 
demonstrated the state’s purpose.  In Elmbrook, the School District was 
not accused of having an express religious purpose in choosing the 
Church as the venue for its graduation ceremony.138  Moreover, unlike 
Stone, the School District’s act of holding the ceremony at the Church 
also did not reveal any true purpose to inject religion into an otherwise 
secular ceremony.  Therefore, to arrive at its conclusion that the School 
District endorsed religion, the court must provide that purpose.  It did so 
 
 132. Id. at 850. 
 133. See supra text accompanying note 74. 
 134. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980). 
 135. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 136. Id. at 690. 
 137. Id. at 691.  Justice Rehnquist also noted the careful attention given to forced religious 
activity within the school environment.  In Lee, the Court struck down prayer at a high school 
graduation ceremony. 505 U.S. at 577.  However, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Nebraska’s 
practice of having a prayer as part of the opening of its state legislature.  Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 
783, 793 (1983). 
 138. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 851 n.14 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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by using the interpretive framework established in the Supreme Court’s 
religious display rulings and found implicit endorsement due to the 
nature and circumstances of the religious environment in which the 
graduation took place.139   
This approach by the Elmbrook majority severely limits the purpose 
prong of the Lemon test by relegating its role to detecting state action 
that, on its face, has a religious purpose.140  In fact, the majority in 
Elmbrook seemed to acknowledge its disregard for Lemon’s purpose 
prong stating that any analysis of the secular motivations of the School 
District would “impermissibly allow Lemon’s purpose inquiry to seep 
into the analysis of the likely effect of the School District’s actions.  
Lemon’s purpose inquiry has rarely proved dispositive.”141  The 
Elmbrook standard ignores the state’s purpose and allows judges to 
artificially attribute endorsement based on the context in which state 
action occurs.  Under Elmbrook, religious endorsement can be imputed 
to any state activity that takes place in a “pervasively religious” 
environment, even if the state requires no religious action or even 
acknowledges that religion is part of the activity at all. 
B. The “Religiously Pervasive Environment” and its Inherently 
Coercive Power 
Relying heavily on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Lee and Santa 
Fe, the court in Elmbrook saw no substantial difference between 
endorsement and coercion.142  Although the students at the School 
District high schools were not asked to participate in a religious activity, 
as the students were in Lee and Santa Fe, the court found that the School 
District’s choice to use a religious site for its graduation, signified that 
the “power, prestige, and financial support” of the School District was 
impermissibly placed behind a certain religious faith.143  This position 
represented an extension of the coercion doctrine far beyond what was 
envisioned in the prior cases of Lee and Santa Fe.  The decision also 
laid out a misguided test for coercion where judges will find implicit 
coercion in any state action that takes place in an environment that is 
deemed to be “pervasively religious.”  Rather than emphasizing the 
coercive action that a state may take in forcing students to participate in 
a religious activity, courts will have to look to whether the environment 
 
 139. Id. at 853. 
 140. Each dissent, on the other hand, would hold that the District’s secular purpose would make 
the graduation ceremony constitutional. 
 141. Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 853 n.16.  
 142. Id. at 855. 
 143. Id. 
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creates a coercive element that would otherwise be present when the 
state requires religious activity.  
The decisions in Lee and Santa Fe were both premised on the 
principle that the “government may not coerce anyone to support or 
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way ‘which 
establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.”144  In 
both cases, the state applied coercive pressure by requesting that the 
students in each situation participate in religious activity.  In Lee, even 
the school administration’s request for silence at the ceremony 
represented a subtle pressure to conform and ran the danger of coercing 
adherence.145  Similarly, in Santa Fe, the delivery of the pre-game 
prayer over the public address system at a high school football game 
commanded those in attendance to participate in the act of worship, 
regardless of their individual beliefs.146  The School District’s 
graduation ceremony was devoid of any such school-sponsored religious 
activity.  To find coercion, the court, much like it did in its finding of 
endorsement, relied on its argument that the Church represented a 
“pervasively religious” environment, and therefore the decision to direct 
students to attend the graduation ceremony represented coercion.147  
Once students had been forced into such a “proselytizing environment” 
there was the danger that a student who held a minority belief would 
witness classmates “taking advantage of the Elmbrook Church’s 
offerings [literature] or meditating on its symbols . . . or speaking with 
staff members.”148  This, according to the court, “may create subtle 
pressure to honor the day in a similar manner.”149  Rather than focus on 
the actions of the state, the court created a hypothetical scenario where a 
non-adhering student seeing classmates gazing at the Church icons 
would suddenly feel pressured to disavow all previous religious beliefs 
or to take up the beliefs espoused by the Church.150  Reasoning that a 
religious environment is somehow contagious and tainted has found no 
acceptance in prior Establishment Clause jurisprudence.151  The holding 
the court announced in Elmbrook took no account of the purpose that the 
state may have had for renting or using religious space.  A violation of 
the Establishment Clause under Elmbrook no longer requires the state to 
 
 144. Lee v. Wiseman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1984) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 
(1984)). 
 145. Id. at 593. 
 146. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000). 
 147. See discussion supra Part IV(A). 
 148. Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 855. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 875 (Posner, J., dissenting) (pointing out that there was never any suggestion that the 
graduation ceremony the Elmbrook Church ever caused anyone to convert religions).  
 151. See supra text accompanying note 125. 
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do anything more than utilize an environment that is judicially 
determined to be too “pervasively religious.”  The religious environment 
itself provides the coercive element, and the necessary state action is 
fulfilled by the state’s mere interaction with such an environment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
While it may be time to heed Justice Scalia’s advice and forever bury 
Lemon, it would be a mistake to allow in its place a standard that ignores 
any analysis of the state’s purpose for its interaction with religion and 
encourages judges to seek out state endorsement of religion in a 
pervasively religious environment.  Consideration of the state’s purpose 
must play a more vital role in assessing instances where a public school 
interacts with religion outside the confines of the school building.  When 
the Ten Commandments are posted on a classroom wall, it is not the 
Decalogue itself that provides endorsement of religion, it is the 
classroom context and the school’s decision to post the Ten 
Commandments that represents an impermissible state endorsement of 
religion.152  In Van Orden, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
same message of state endorsement of religion cannot apply to instances 
where the state interacts with religious symbols outside of the classroom 
as it does when the state brings those symbols into the classroom.153  In 
cases where the state interacts with religious symbols in a non-
classroom setting, courts should place a greater emphasis on the state’s 
purpose rather than dismiss it as the Elmbrook majority did.  A stronger 
analysis of purpose acknowledges the effect of endorsement that the 
introduction of religious symbols into the classroom environment may 
have, but distinguishes those situations from instances where the state 
interacts with religious environments with no motive to endorse religion 
or to coerce religious activities.   
Though in its opinion the court did its best to narrow its holding, the 
actions taken by the court to redefine endorsement and coercion will 
have a lasting impact on the relationship between the state and religious 
institutions.  Under Elmbrook, if a state institution wants to use a 
religious environment for a single secular event, then it must ensure that 
such an environment does not have any religious symbols.  If there are 
symbols, the court cautions that an attempt to gain control of the 
environment or rid it of its religious overtones will run afoul of Lemon’s 
 
 152. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 691 (2005). 
 153. Id. (“Edwards v. Aguillard recognized that Stone—along with Schempp and Engel—was a 
consequence of the ‘particular concerns that arise in the context of public elementary and secondary 
schools.’  Neither Stone itself nor subsequent opinions have indicated that Stone’s holding would extend 
to a legislative chamber . . . or to capitol grounds.”). 
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excessive entanglement prong.154  Moreover, there is no barometer as to 
which environments are “pervasively religious” and which are not, since 
the court is the one to determine such a question.  The safest course then 
would be for the state not to engage any religious environment, even in 
an arms-length transaction.  As Judge Ripple stated, this course would 
mean that only “a religious entity that strips itself down to a vanilla 
version of its real self is to be acceptable in the important moments of 
American civil life.”155   
The application of the court’s new standard for implicit coercion is 
impractical and unworkable.  Rather than looking to whether the state 
coerced religious activity, a court will assess the religious institution in 
which an event occurs and if it finds that it is pervasively religious, then 
any interaction between the state and that institution will represent 
coerced religious activity.  Moreover, given that the state is prevented 
by dangers of entanglement from modifying such an environment, the 
state is left with no choice but to find another venue.  As a few members 
of the dissent point out, if the majority’s definition of coercion is 
accepted, then public high school athletic teams may be precluded from 
entering parochial schools for athletic events, election boards may not 
be allowed to use religious institutions as polling places, and students 
will not be able to tour the National Gallery in Washington or listen to 
oral arguments in the Seventh Circuit.156  This interpretation stretches 
the concept of coercion far beyond that envisioned by the Supreme 
Court. 
The Seventh Circuit cannot be faulted for its effort to protect religious 
freedom and to ensure that choice in matters of religion is preserved in 
the conscience of each individual.  This is certainly a liberty that should 
be protected from too much government interference.  The tortured 
jurisprudential history of the Establishment Clause and the fractured 
nature of the Elmbrook opinion demonstrate that the framework for 
analyzing interactions between church and state is anything but settled.  
The pervading influence of religion in American society and the 
importance of religious freedom demand a clear standard.  However, the 
answer is not in a standard that ignores any analysis of the state’s 
purpose for its action and imputes into those actions unconstitutional 
religious endorsement and coercion based upon a judicial determination 
that an environment is too “pervasively religious.” 
 
 154. Elmbrook, 687 F.3d at 878 n.18. 
 155. Id. at 866. 
 156. Id. at 867, 874. 
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